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Bureaucracy Transcended? New Patterns of Employment Regulation and Labour Control in the International Automotive Industry
Valeria Pulignano and Paul Stewart
Introduction
During the last two decades the notion of post-modern organisations has emerged as a central theme in management and labour studies in research into the changing nature of the firm.  It has been notably associated with changes in the nature of work and employment regulation supposedly necessary for global competition.  The assumption is that the reorganisation of core work permits workers to enhance performance through participating in decisions that alter the traditional Taylorist organisational routines (Appelbaum et al., 2000).  Thus, work is reorganised in such a way as to use participative shop-floor production teams in problem solving and statistical process control.  Moreover, individuals should be rewarded on the basis of their contribution to company performance.  These supposedly are at the heart of the new organisational transformations.  Among many practitioners and researchers this transformation seems to have been taken as a sign of a shift from Weber’s typology of bureaucracy to post-bureaucracy at the level of work organisation.  What is commonly agreed is that at the heart of societal notions of the post-bureaucratic organisation is the idea of a more flexible, integrated and increasingly productive set of employment and industrial relations requiring changes in the methods of production and corporate organisational structures. 

Writing in the early 1980s, Thompson argued that the increasing concern amongst a number of writers with the supposed shift from fordist to post fordist regimes of accumulation and control established a binary view of change that while influential was largely short on evidence (Thompson, 1983).  It could be argued that we are currently in difficulty with another persuasive binary view of change in the guise of the bureaucratic versus the post bureaucratic organisation. More specifically, within labour and organisational sociology a particular post-modern agenda can be seen to have antecedents in the notion of “flexible specialisation” (Piore and Sabel 1984), “disorganised capitalism” (Lash and Urry, 1987) and “corporate culturism” (Ouchi, 1981; Peters and Waterman, 1982).  In distinctive ways each sought to portray organisational change as in some fashion leading to the terminal decline of inflexible work rules replaced increasingly by informal arrangements.  The new binary view sees the development of a novel dispensation whereby bureaucratic rules and procedures no longer remain the touch stone of employee domination. As some sociological studies have highlighted, disciplinary practices are endorsed through discourses operating to create power effects on individuals and the employment relationship (Willmott, 1993; Townley, 1993; Parker, 1999).  Individuals become objects of knowledge and thereby think and behave through the rationality of “corporate culture” (Van Mannen and Kunda, 1989) where in employment relationships are regulated neither by rational rules and regulations nor by hierarchy, but rather from “concertive value-based actions of the organisation’s members” (Barker, 1999: 38). Hence, work place change is assumed to be the outcome of the ‘concertive’ actions of employees rather than the negotiation process undertaken on the shop floor. 

Drawn from research into recent organisational change in the international automotive industry following the establishment of multi-enterprise settings in Fiat (Italy), Volkswagen (VW, Brazil) and Renault (France), we highlight the persistence of bureaucratic domination in the process of organisational transformation.  The paper links the persistence of bureaucratic domination to two interrelated processes: the ‘marketization’ of inter firm relations on the one hand and the impact of such ‘marketisation’ on the regulation of employment relations on the other.  Cross-company and country evidence is presented to illustrate the re-emergence of bureaucracy understood as the formal economic and external rules by which employment is regulated in new organisational systems.  This is a significant finding precisely because much research into lean production (or, as it is sometimes known, total quality management) has created the mistaken impression that organisational life is based increasingly on much looser informal (qua, flexible) rules and arrangements.  Yet the picture we draw here is that much looser rules (where they exist) do not mean that the overall weight of bureaucratic regulations has lessened. The emergence of discourses of disciplinary power seen as critical measures of restraint in the creation of an individual’s self-identity do not negate the new bureaucratic dispensation.  Bureaucratic forms of control have been refined rather than supplanted. In the context of the emergence of multi-enterprise settings, an elaborate system of incentives render company profitability and individual earnings dependent on the level of the firm’s performance. Incentives, seen as individual reward for quality are not included in the management-union negotiations on the shop floor.  Economic calculations (disciplinary rewards, forms of evaluation and profit-sharing), function (in theory) to curb the local union’s ability to maintain job controls. We argue that bureaucracy is, paradoxically, revitalised in such a way as to pose new challenges for labour.
Research Design 
The research reported here draws principally upon qualitative data collected during intensive field-based research between 2000-2001. More than 60 interviews were conducted with employees, union representatives, union members, operations and plant-managers across the supplier firms and car manufacturers in two Fiat plants (Mirafiori and Rivalta) in Turin (Italy), VW in Resende (Brazil) and Renault in Sandouville (France).​[1]​ The semi structured interviews collected information on the process of contracting out, the intention being to account for the process of outsourcing practices to companies co-located under the same roof (multi-enterprise organisation) forming part of a new configuration of workplace production and employment relations. The interviews lasted for one to two hours and were conducted during visits to the four plants.  Each plant assessment was based on a number of visits over two to three weeks and the various parties were interviewed jointly and separately as occasion required. Considering the richness and intensity of the changes in the various locations, some plants were visited on up to three occasions when direct observation of work relations and other social interactions was undertaken.  The interviews and other data have been supplemented by published and unpublished documentary material. The first round of research, which covered the Italian case, was completed between June and July 2000. Further work was carried out between August and September 2000 in Brazil.  The restructuring process in Renault was investigated in May 2001.  


‘Regulation’ and ‘control’ in post-bureaucratic organisations 
While the binary fordism/post fordism is a somewhat dated analytical device it nevertheless resonates in post-bureaucratic accounts of organisational change.  According to Vallas (1999) two distinct strains of flexibility theory can be identified in post-fordist accounts of change.  The first is the “flexible specialisation” approach, which emphasises the nature of inter-firm relationships and stresses extra-organisational influences such as the continuous shifting of product markets and consumer tastes, considering them to be major sources of workplace change.  From this vantage point, the main objectives reveal the arbitrary nature of the constrained notion of “fordism” while specifying the conditions necessary for overcoming it.  The second and possibly most important strain of flexibility theory under the heading of post-Fordism is the post-hierarchical, or post-bureaucratic, model of work.  In this orientation, firms are considered capable of forging new organisational structures that engage fully the skills of their employees because managerial decisions about production are decentralised.  That is to say, the main feature of the new work regime is the supposed paradigm shift from technical, or bureaucratic, modes of workplace regulation to a decentralisation and de-bureaucratisation of the labour process.  This can be witnessed in the tropes of work reorganisation, teamwork, quality circles and new profit centres.  The constant focus is on the ending of (supposedly) inflexible work rules and formality and, therefore, on the increase of more informal arrangements for the governance of production and work organisation. The idea is that co-operation occurs through corporate culture and values acting as the glue holding the decentralised parts of the new organisation together.  A clear example of this would be the possibility that long-term strategic planning, including detailed monitoring of schedules, occurs lower down the corporate structure, finally at the team level.  The assumption is that this increases workers’ trust in management while enhancing intrinsic rewards from work.  The consequence of this, of course, is that trust and intrinsic rewards are seen to have strong positive effects on job satisfaction and organisational commitment.  Specifically, workplace relations are seen to rely primarily on the motivational benefits of team activity.  Moreover, while financial and economic incentives are seen as important they are not believed to be prominent in regulating employment. Productivity is supposedly now to be driven by workers psychological (and emotional) commitment more than by rigid bureaucratic rules. (Barker, 1993; Reed, 1993; Wilkinson and Willmott, 1995).





Contemporary pathways in motor manufacturing: managing ‘multi-enterprise’ settings
Restructuring at Fiat-Italy 
At the beginning of the 1990s, with the move to the ‘Integrated Factory’ model, Fiat sought to appropriate the principles of a version of Japanese work and production reorganisation.  In seeking improved quality, Fiat produced a new system of organisation that placed human resources at the heart of the new management agenda.  This agenda saw the employer introducing an integrated model of work organisation based on team working called the Basic Technological Unit (Unità Tecnologica Elementare or UTE), designed to ensure a win-win scenario of high productivity allowing for worker and employer prosperity.​[2]​ Under the ‘Integrated Factory’ model the assembly line is still under the ownership of Fiat while the process of externalisation of production merely involves outsourcing component manufacturing. 




The new pattern of multi-enterprise settings has increased organisational complexity in the plant, inevitably leading to new rules governing both production and employment issues (Bonazzi and Antonelli, 2003).  In particular, at the two Fiat plants, the governance system covering Fiat and the suppliers on the one hand and management and unions on the other has been completely reorganised.  The unions have negotiated on the social effects of restructuring, including the terms and conditions of employment rights of representation across the different enterprises.  This was possible due to the strong union influence at the two traditionally most adversarial production sites and it ensured the harmonisation of employment conditions (most notably pay and working time) to all employees working side-by-side at the Mirafiori and Rivalta plants.  This was followed by an extension of the company sector-level agreement (the so-called integrativo Fiat) to supplier firms involved in the externalisation process.  Pay integration and the establishment of joint union-management ‘consultation bodies’ for all employees working at the new site have been central to the unions’ objectives.  As a result, unions have been able to enhance their power and influence in the multi-enterprise workplace.  Intriguingly, this was achieved at each production site by the creation of horizontal collective representation structures, covering the employees across both the vehicle manufacturer and the supplier firms. This gave unions voice in decisions affecting their work at plant level while at the same time promoting co-ordination among members in the various companies (see Pulignano, 2005).  
At Mirafiori and Rivalta, the coordination of production activities was less problematic because the level of fragmentation of the production process is such that the motor manufacturer holds direct responsibility for the overall production flow.  Specifically, each firm’s task and responsibility is clearly defined by Fiat.  As a result, conventional forms of control, which are employed through the use of team work as a potential tool to discipline employees, operate in conjunction with structured rules for managing employment relationships across the diverse firms where pay is linked to company performance.  However, in Italy, this linkage is not ‘voluntary’ but rather governed by sector-based rules, which it is assumed, ensure regulated flexibility.  As a result of the 1993 Social Pact (or, tripartite agreement), bargaining assumed a more decentralised pattern at the company level in Italy, but the national industry unions and employers’ associations still retain control over the negotiation of employment conditions.  Centrally negotiated guidelines are adapted to circumstances at local level so that where company or plant-level bargaining occurs, negotiations produce agreements that do not replace strong industry-wide pattern bargaining. Pay increases (and bonus) - negotiated at company level every four years - have to be linked to the results of the so-called development programmes agreed between management and unions at sector-level. 
It is important therefore to understand that labour regulation, as a system incorporating penalties and disciplinary rewards, underscores Fiat’s monitoring of its suppliers’ performance.  In this respect the system can be understood as an instrument of governance of the contractual relations between buyer and supplier.  Thus, problem-solving within each supplier firm turned out to be an activity driven essentially by fear of penalty or, the acknowledgment of a reward, from Fiat.  Flexibility is thereby tied technically to the production process of the entire organisation and is seen as crucial to the achievement of the desired level of assembler 
At multi-enterprise workplaces flexibility means to co-operate with the interests of the whole organisation.  This is achieved by Fiat through assessing the level of performance reached by each supplier, and it is therefore the result of calculative or economic rules, which play in order to govern inter-firm relations (Fiat Production Manager – July, 2000)  
These calculative rules notably have a profound impact on employment relations. In particular, contract companies and employees are subject to similar forms of evaluation that prioritise performance-related production incentives.  In short, performance-related pay links worker remuneration to enterprise contract. However, as already indicated, the nature of this link is regulated at the company-level in accordance with arrangements negotiated with the national union at sector-level.  Thus, poor annual assessment of firms held responsible for stopping or slowing production is measured along the power relations between the car manufacturer and the suppliers and from there to the employee.  As a Fiat employee remarks, the result may be a reduction of individual reward:

Last week Fiat found out that some of the wheels we sent did not conform to the standard of quality they were expecting. Of course this is not Fiat’s responsibility, but it is the responsibility of the supplier responsible of manufacturing the wheels. That supplier is paid for delivering a good product. The worker who produced the faulty wheels was penalised, at the end of the day he lost money he could have earned as individual reward. This would not have happened previously whether the wheels had been produced by Fiat employees since everything would have been accommodated informally (Fiat Employee – June, 2000).
This sets up a dynamic whereby employees’ cohesion and commitment is secured by the threat to individual earnings. Workers understand how annual assessments used by multi-enterprise organisations are very much part of the creation of a form of ‘consumption’ whose rules are shaped by market rationale.  As one employee in TNT put it: “Performance assessment is how management is monitoring the production process. We are assessed internally by the company but on the basis of what Fiat will say about us”.​[3]​

Contracting out in Renault 
Despite a long tradition of vertical integration, the challenges posed by globalisation since the mid-1980s led Renault to broaden the range of products while increasing quality. Restructuring became key in meeting this challenge. In the attempt to reform assembly-line work and production, Renault used the reorganisation model inspired by notions of Japanese total quality management. As Freyssenet (1999) remarks, a wide-ranging debate developed between management, trade unions and external experts with the aim of outlining the transformations that the company would need to undergo. Among these were changes to the way skill was negotiated, change in the management of working time, reorganisation of work, and development in training and professional orientation. Some new concepts emerged with the diffusion of teamwork, such as the Elementary Work Unit (Unité Technologique Elémentaire). Moreover, new principles for contractual relations between suppliers and assembler were introduced which contributed to the expansion of contracting out.
Contracting out grew more substantially over the mid-1990s, involving the use of contractors in both service and production activities operating directly on-site. A particular example of this practice was the Renault truck plant in Sandouville in the north of France, between 1998 and 1999.  Here, contracting out mainly consisted in the location of suppliers inside Renault’s plant.  This resulted in a number of on-line parts assemblies (i.e. door, seat, head liners, fuel tanks, wiring and cabling, carpet, door panels, dash board, console, bumper) and services (i.e. logistics and maintenance) were contracted out to supplier firms. At the beginning of 2000, 621 out of 3,700 employees were contracted out to seven supplier firms engaged in the production of truck components (see table 2). 
[Table 1.2 here]
Sandouville is a traditional brownfield plant without a long-standing network of suppliers. Thus, Renault developed forms of multi-enterprise organisation by clustering the supplier firms in what they termed an ‘industrial hotel’.​[4]​ This can be understood as new loci where disciplinary rewards and forms of evaluation govern the new inter-firm relations.  In particular, relationships between Renault and the supplier firms operating within the ‘industrial hotel’ are regulated by contractual rules.  One consequence is that supplier firms’ commitment to quality production standards is subordinated to contract rules regulating the transaction between the assembler and the suppliers. Renault’s contract rules impose a form of monitoring of the production process through the use of rewards or penalties. Generally speaking, rewards and penalties are determined on the basis of the ability to meet the motor manufacturer’s production and quality targets regarding service delivery and/or the production of the product formally established in the contact. Observation at the Renault plant in Sandouville indicated that in the first instance, Renault brought together the supply firms to help them understand the functioning of the new organisation (the ‘industrial hotel’).  Subsequently, suppliers were encouraged to agree on strategic objectives and even to debate solutions to organisational problems across the network.  
This integration impacted very directly on labour relations where there has been a common approach to performance standards and skills profiles notably using appraisal meetings with each supplier in order to evaluate work including discipline and rewards. For instance, a bonus system to boost employee performance motivation was introduced so as to better integrate salaries with notions of supplier service quality.  The unions at Renault (especially the Confédération Francaise Démocratique du Travail-CFDT) originally used the information rights of the comité d’enterprise, including rights of autonomous expertise, to gain time and elaborate a protection plan for employment benefits as the union’s response to industrial reorganisation. However, it is important to note that the low unionisation rate in France (9 per cent) - and even lower at Renault – constrained the unions’ scope for extending a negotiated agreement on pay and conditions with management into collective bargaining proper via a formal agreement.  By contrast, management sees the reward system as the automatic result of the economic rules regulating contractual inter-firms relationships in the ‘industrial hotel’.  
Furthermore, one should argue that the reward system, which was introduced into the suppliers to monitor the level of company performance, was also intended to increase the level of employee cohesion in pursuit of Renault’s goals (Freyssenet, 1999).  Thus, under the ‘industrial hotel’ regime, rewards and penalties in turn define the daily conditions of work.  Two employees observed: 
“We [employees] need to remember that the possibility of being rewarded depends on the ability to deliver good products and to deliver them ‘on time’ by respecting the contractual conditions requested by Renault (Employee of Renault supplier firm - May, 2001).
Career depends on the level of performance achieved by the company within the ‘industrial hotel’ in respect to the goals achieved by the organisation as a result of inter-firm co-operation (Renault employee – May 2001)
Thus, disciplinary forms of evaluation are introduced to shape and stimulate inter firm co-operation at the level of the shop floor in the pursuit of Renault’s agenda.  (Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2005, assessment of the impact of new team working strategies in the French sector, highlight their problematical impact on worker quality of working life).  As a supervisor in Renault remarked, the aim is to develop a new system of production that can continuously and autonomously improve the level of the company’s performance by linking pay rewards to the level of quality of the service or the product.  To sum up, contracting out is identified as an opportunity by Renault to improve production flexibility through economies of specialisation that can reinforce the dependence of its supplier firms.  This dependency is driven by monetary calculation and consequently by insecurity amongst suppliers, mindful of the penalties accruing for failure to meet contract obligations.  Correspondingly, the effect on employees is one of pressure driven by the obligation to meet Renault’s standards. 


A brave new world in VW corporation
Volkswagen introduced ex-novo the concept of ‘modular consortium’ at the greenfield Resende bus and truck plant in Brazil (in the state of Rio de Janeiro), which was inaugurated in June 1996.  Modular production at Resende comprises a new pattern of employee organisation within VW’s plant where the suppliers (a ‘modular consortium’ of US, German and Brazilian multinational companies) ‘simultaneously manufacture’ the truck sequentially and are responsible for the management of their own employees.  This means that VW is not involved directly in the manufacturing process because all parts are aggregated together directly on the assembly line by supplier firms.  Meanwhile, VW is concerned with strategic functions such as product engineering, marketing and product policies, quality, vehicle design, architecture and sales: 799 out of 1,037 employees are hourly paid and work for eight sub-contracting firms known as parceiros, whose size varies according to the complexity and the nature of the product; 200 out of those 799 employees work in maintenance logistics.  Very few employees (211 out of 1,037) are salaried shop-floor workers employed directly by VW, 36 of whom are high-level managers (see Table 3). 
[Table 1.3 here]
Governance of the modular organisation consists of centralising information and monitoring activities while decentralising responsibility to the parceiros for module manufacture. This presupposes tight co-operation between the different parties and in reaching this objective the organisation overcomes the diseconomies of co-ordination normally associated with arrangements among separate firms (Abreu et al., 2000).  The specific pattern of modular organisation at Resende lies in the fact that internal formal relations regulating inter firm relationships not only shape the modular production flow but also regulate conditions of employment within the parceiros.  As a VW production manager remarks: “parceiros are paid only when the truck is ready to be sold!”.​[5]​ The flow production system makes little space for worker and union involvement and corporate discussion is especially lukewarm about collective bargaining (Ramalho and Santana, 2003).  Corporate discussions on wages, benefits and risk-sharing soon became part of the daily management agenda.  This is because the ‘modular’ system implies a division of the risk traditionally wholly assumed by VW and its consortium players.  Several interviewees highlighted the implications of risk sharing with respect to employee management.  A VDO employee explains: “those people who are performing well felt they might end up losing since their performance depends on how somebody else performs”.  As he sees it, this fuels an incentive to work together to achieve VW’s objectives:

In VW at Resende we share the possibility of receiving a salary.  This means that although I do my job well but my colleague in another firm is doing badly at the end of the day VW will not buy that truck! The truck is not ready to be sold yet! Thus, although I did well I will risk as much as my colleague who made a mistake because I am then in danger of not receiving a salary or even worse being sacked.  For this reason we help one another, otherwise we would have never been able to make the target! (VDO – paint shop - employee – September, 2000) 
VW’s modular system pre-empted the inherent conflict in wage disparities between workers of the different companies within the parceiros by introducing a common wage and benefits agreement.  Intriguingly, this was supported by the dominant union in the plant, Forςa Sindical, a conservative company-union opposed to the socialist Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), which dominates the motor industry district, the ABC region, of Săo Paulo. 
In moving to Resende to build up a new pattern of production organisation, the main aim of VW was to avoid the industrial relations ‘habits’ of the Săo Paulo region.  Resende, an area of high unemployment is where labour relationships are somewhat less conflictual than in the ABC region.  This helped to bolster the impression among VW managers that Forςa Sindical would follow the company’s lead on all matters.  This notion of the ‘company-union’ became very powerful and was seen as critical in allowing the introduction of the modular consortium’s new economic governance rules. This was highlighted right from the start when Forςa Sindical accepted management’s opposition to the introduction of the national wage common across the Brazilian automotive industry.  However, interestingly, workers were able to accept leverage on each parceiro because in meeting the daily production conditions they found a mechanism by which they were able to extract higher wages compared to their colleagues in the ABC region.  Nevertheless, one of costs is the extremely limited space for collective representation and notably over the negotiation of employee rights where there is organisational change.  This is because employment relations are automatically regulated through the economic rules of ‘marketisation’ which function to co-ordinate the various firms at the multi-enterprise level.  As a result working conditions and wages and benefits depend on the extent to which the parceiro meets VW’s requirements. The bargaining power of the social actors is important, except in two telling respects – the ‘banking of hours’ and the harmonisation of wages.  Wage increases within the modular consortium are distributed equally amongst VW and other firms’ assembly-line workers to iron out obstacles to production flexibility.  Moreover, the introduction of the ‘hours bank’ was negotiated at plant level with the employee representatives (works councils or comissăo de făbrica).  Generally speaking, the ‘hours bank’ operates to increase plant-level working time flexibility as it allows the company to reduce or increase working time during an average working week without penalty (either to workers or consortium members). 
Further, a crucial aspect to highlight while examining the economic nature of the pillars surrounding the functioning of the modular set-up is that wages are strongly dependent on the profit-sharing system governing the inter-firm relations within the consortium.  This is supposed to promote and strengthen the cohesion of workers in the pursuit of capital accumulation.  In this context, employees are encouraged to adjust their behaviour in an effort to produce a level of performance compatible with maintaining the overall production process.  This increases the pressure on employees ‘naturally’ because corporate objectives are defined, in monetary terms, as the imperative to sell the truck to the assembler, and therefore produce profit.  Accordingly, the concept of teamwork is redefined by a supervisor in ‘Carese’ - the paint shop:  
Under the ‘modular consortium’, ‘team’ is not the small-medium group of people working in a single company but team means all the parceiros working together for selling the truck to VW.  This is the new concept of team (Supervisor Carese – September, 2000).  
Beneath the thin veneer of sociability and the rhetoric of corporate culture, the concept of market relations governing inter-firm relations under modularity is designed to raise productivity by linking employment arrangements to the profits of the ‘modular consortium’ as a whole. Generally speaking, the critical pressure driving shop floor employees to conform to the themes of quality, process improvements and participation in the VW modular system stems from market relations between the various suppliers.  These relations are regulated by formal rules by which mutual interdependence between the assembler and the suppliers is ensured.  As a VDO supervisor - the trim shop – reported, “everyone working on the shop floor must look at the indicator shown in the diagram; we must work properly to reach VW targets”.  Hence, objective rules rather than the sense of employee loyalty and commitment – or indeed, weak labour union bargaining power – are the critical movers of organisational change at Resende.

Contemporary patterns of firm association in motor manufacturing: ‘market’ and ‘bureaucracy’ as the makings of a new production system 
As we have argued, during 1990s auto manufacturers worldwide repeatedly sought many of what they took to be principles of Japanese work and production reorganisation. The objective was to increase quality through the creation of a new system of organisation focussed on placing human resources and flexible forms of work at the heart of the new management agenda. Accordingly, the shift towards integrated systems of team working, including quality circles, was designed to ensure high productivity and mutual dependency among workers and employers alike.  Here, the context is one in which the assembly line is owned by the motor manufacturer, while externalisation of production involves components manufactured by external suppliers.
As the case studies of Fiat, Renault and VW illustrate, since the second half of the 1990s a number of workplaces have been transformed by a complex web of inter firm relationships characterised by a series of special partnership arrangements impacting directly upon work and employment.  The three selected companies see themselves as innovators in the development of forms of contracting out that entail the redefinition of the firm’s core activity in the car-manufacturing sector both in Europe and Latin America.  These are described as the ‘multi enterprise’, or ‘modular factory’, model and here diversity in the level and complexity of co-ordinating production activities within each of the manufacturing sites emerges as one of the main findings of the study.  To what extent does this diversity impact on employees’ perceptions of responsibilities and commitments?  Do they tend to see these in terms of the needs of their direct employer or the wider network organisation typical of a multi-enterprise organisation?  How far does the development of simultaneously more fragmented and networked organisational forms raise new issues concerning employment regulation and labour control? To what extent are labour unions involved in the regulation of employment under the new transformation in organisation? 
First, findings highlight the extent to which automotive manufacturers in these settings seek to reduce responsibility for capital investment through the externalisation of an independently assembled production unit or service. This has been aided by the development of formalised internal agreements among assembler and suppliers at the multi-enterprise settings aimed at devolving even greater responsibility for manufacture to the supplier.  Our findings here support Sako and Warburton’s (1999) argument that shifting towards multi-enterprise, or ‘modular’ systems, leads to the generation of a new form of relationship among firms, whereby the boundaries of the industry, including the definition of the business and the risks directly linked to it, are reshaped. Because of the need for on-site co-ordination of many outsourced operations, the fragmentation of the business can be expected to generate new forms of activity for the organisation which in turn require new ways of managing.  The co-operative strength assumed to derive from the modular system includes partnership and contractual arrangements among diverse enterprises, which in turn shape the regulation of labour and employment in the new workplace. 
Second, diversity in contracting out places differential emphasis on the elements used to co-ordinate the production activities within each plant that in turn reflects a varied level of organisational complexity.  For sure, all of the plants in the study have been affected by the corporate promotion of synchronous manufacturing on the line as a result of the diverse enterprises operating in situ.  However, while in Fiat and Renault, co-ordination of diverse activities was filtered through the vehicle manufacturer holding direct responsibility for parts of the production flow, at VW the assembly line was entirely fragmented with each part under the responsibility of a different enterprise. The difference in the level of organisational complexity has a significant impact on the nature of the monitoring and control of employees within the three car manufacturers and, thereby, underlines diverse approaches to ‘marketisation’.  While Renault and Fiat are characterised by more conventional forms of  ‘marketisation’ of inter firm relations (described by Danford, 1997, in another context as “management by fear”) combining elements of post-bureaucratic organisational employee monitoring and control (such as teamwork – again see, Gorgeu and Mathieu, 2005) with economic measures of the level of company performance, at VW by contrast, profit sharing is the rationale pressurising shop floor employees.  Similarities, of course, are important too and notably when we consider the significance of bureaucracy as highlighted at Fiat and Renault where we witnessed the emergence of contractual inter-firm obligations regulated by disciplinary rewards and at VW, where financial arrangements are bureaucratically driven by a profit-sharing rationale.  In seeking employee compliance and control, these practices (i.e. discipline rewards, work evaluation and profit-sharing) support the logic of ‘marketisation’ governing the fragmented organisations.  Moreover, as we shall now argue, the control of the labour process takes on greater complexity in multi-enterprise settings requiring changes to the way labour representatives are involved in managing employment concerns. 

Regulating employment and workplace representation: a cross-country firm analysis of new patterns of production
While the single employer-employee relationship based around an employment contract is often taken to signify traditional employment relations, the complex and diverse meaning of the employment relationship in the context of multi enterprise settings poses another set of concerns.  As has been emphasised elsewhere, employers bound into inter-firm relationships tend to delegate responsibility for work and production organisation to the suppliers around whom employment relationships are constructed (Thompson and McHugh, 2001).  This is important because it is a means of ensuring that the supplier firm has a strong business incentive to ensure manufacturing or service quality. This incentive is exercised through internal formal relations regulating conditions and benefits that are determined largely by the dominant player. In the Brazilian case, for example, it is especially onerous on the supplier who has to accept production schedules and quotas determined by VW. Prior agreement about shared risk may obviously entail losses in production, and profits, in accordance with the whole profit-sharing rationale that each of the parties in the multi-enterprise setting, dominated by VW, has to sign up to.  
Whereas the vehicle manufacturer traditionally wholly assumed risk, at VW the component suppliers are involved in a detailed legal and financial relationship with the vehicle manufacturer involving the establishment of medium to long-term production relationships in which the supplier is forced into a dependant relationship. A number of our interviewees highlighted the employee relations implications of the cross-organisational contractual arrangements among firms in VW. Some working for a supplier felt considerable insecurity about the possibility of losing out where somebody else in another enterprise might have been responsible for poor production results.  In this context the success of one firm is being increasingly judged by, and dependent upon, the performance of the other firms and this inevitably shapes the nature of the mechanisms through which labour discipline is enacted within the plant.  The question then arises as to the role played by employees and their representatives in the regulation of the employment relationship.  VW determines the rules of the modular system by dominating wage bargaining.  Employee social benefits are subordinated to the emphasis on the inter-firm profit sharing strategy.  The unions, in other words, are subordinated to VW’s agenda.  (See chapter in this book on WV Resende)  
In the less developed cases of modularity at Fiat and Renault, it is disciplinary rewards rather than profit-sharing arrangements that regulate the multi enterprise settings.  More specifically, one might argue that the mechanisms used to achieve labour compliance in the less developed cases of modularity are a mixed variety of labour market tools, providing positive incentives through reward systems and career ladders.  Sanctions of course, as we argued, are crucial here.  At Fiat and Renault, negative penalties and positive incentives were institutionalised in rules that inspired the behaviour of both managers and employees within each enterprise.  To be sure, management control component suppliers and suppliers’ employees in much the same way as if they were assembly line production employees working in teams in a (now) conventionally understood lean production plant.  This is important in highlighting the way in which monitoring and evaluation are embedded in the fabric of production.  A weak production record could jeopardise an extension of the supplier’s contract and, of course, employees’ benefits, not to mention jobs.  
A critical issue here is union and employee involvement in managing the new organisational configurations.  The Fiat case presents compelling evidence of union participation in bargaining on the social implications of industrial change.  As indicated already, this is contingent upon socio-political and institutional factors, the latter most notably embedded in sector rules governing decentralised workplace relations in Italy.  The situation in France is inevitably different and since the mid 1980s, employers, and more especially the state, have supported company-based labour relations.  The contrast with Brazil is interesting where the regional structure of the labour market has favoured a highly fragmented national industrial relations system.  As a result, labour relations in Brazil are decentralised at plant-level and the outcomes of the negotiation process depend on the key role played by employee representatives and works councils.  In contrast to France and Brazil, our examination of the Italian automotive sector illustrates union influence over the regulation of labour against a backdrop of restructuring.  Nevertheless, despite these variations, research has highlighted a degree of convergence in which contractual arrangements between the different enterprises impact on the regulation of the day-to-day treatment of employees in the plants.  In broad terms, it is the economic rules regulating contractual relationships in Fiat – and Renault and VW – as opposed to the negotiation of social issues that have turned out to be the force governing inter-firm and employment relationships in our case studies.
Broadly, in institutional terms we can say that differences notwithstanding, control and involvement from one party or firm in managing the labour process and workers from another firm is crucial in ensuring the required performance level in multi-enterprise settings. This performance level is guaranteed through specific contractual obligations (Renault and Fiat) and financial commitments (VW) which are likely to be imposed for controlling effort levels and quality of work.  Thus, in consequence, control of the labour process takes on greater complexity when we move away from direct command and control to a focus on more ‘objective’ work and employment rules.  The monitoring and evaluation of performance, the rewards and discipline of workers through performance assessment and inter-firm financial arrangements are elements defining the economic nature of labour discipline under the ‘marketisation’.  A significant tendency is for labour representatives to see their role in negotiating employment regulation considerably reduced.  Trade union involvement, in other words, is limited to negotiating some basic safeguards (such as working time, skills training, job security and working conditions).  In fairness to the unions, it is difficult to see how this marginalisation might be easily transcended.  The intention of reorganising production to ensure inter-employer co-operation was primarily based on the need to instil new behavioural patterns specifying performance standards including written definitions of skills.  While such systems indicate significant aspects of career development, they are also important in institutionalising values that allow both management and employees specific criteria on which to evaluate worker performance.  As part of the new working arrangements, these criteria are generally not negotiated with the unions at company or plant level. Rather, they are experienced by the workforce as part of the new ‘natural’ set of economic rules governing industrial adjustment.  For example, management in Renault has unilaterally developed five formal core standards for performance measurement which, while having an indirect influence on line pacing and direction of work, exert a more obvious impact on monitoring and evaluation, and, consequently, reward and discipline.  The core standards are: high product quality, precise delivery time, prompt intervention to correct errors, transparency and, finally, recognition that the supplier company’s conduct is indelibly tied to customer perceptions of the vehicle manufacturer. As we have seen, agreed performance standards and skills profiles are used to evaluate work, which includes critical discussion regarding worker reward and discipline.
A number of the middle managers in our three companies considered this organisational link between performance and reward an efficient way to promote the aims of the production network without either direct control of manufacturing operations, or employees’ involvement in self-managing activities (such as teamwork).  The regulation of the new organisational system therefore requires workers prompt response to the new company-based performance criteria while at the same time isolating the implications of this from the negotiation of employment benefits.  This was crucial at Fiat where unions were involved in guaranteeing improved working conditions (including wages) and inter-firm contractual arrangements became the basis for the regulation of employment relations across the Fiat network.  This is especially interesting because it contrasts with conventional forms of employee involvement where internalised values of quality, flexibility and value-added activity are considered the basis for gaining competitive organisational advantage. In our case studies, monitoring takes place through the mobilisation of economic indicators measuring company performance while also enabling management to achieve the required level of profitability – the ‘market’ becomes the new regulatory principle.  These economic measures were introduced to shape and stimulate labour control while undermining the involvement of the employee representatives’ attempts to negotiate criteria governing the functioning of the new organisational settings. The extent of such involvement is left to the institutional country-based strategies of coordination at industry-level characterising the bargaining experience of some southern European countries. Research findings illustrate that in both less and more developed cases of modularity labour compliance is achieved through the development of economic measures for inter-firm regulation. The differences between the firms, however, are important.  While in Fiat and Renault market relations focus primarily on individual contributions to the performance of the company, in VW they are directly embedded in the logic of profit sharing and therefore appear neutral, a product merely of technical necessity naturalised by simultaneous manufacturing (Arbix and Zilbovicius, 1997; Abreu et al., 2000).  Generally speaking, multi-enterprise settings in this sector can therefore be seen as allowing an opportunity for the vehicle manufacturer to generate production by reinforcing dependence on either individualised labour market tools (reward systems, career promotion) or financial inter-firm arrangements (profit-sharing) which limit employees and labour representatives’ engagement. 
Moreover, there is a further aspect that needs to be taken into consideration in order to examine patterns of labour discipline and, thereby, employment regulation in the most advanced form of multi-enterprise environment. In our cases, labour compliance and involvement is achieved to a significant degree through production results measured on the basis of visible performance indicators of quality, output and delivery.  Intensive communication across boundaries between middle managers in both vehicle manufacturers and supplier firms supports this activity, which crucially remains outside union control.  The degree of effectiveness of this communication impacts upon the ability of the supplier to be competitive while crucially maintaining good relations with the vehicle manufacturer, the main player.  Nevertheless, as these research findings suggest, while introducing mechanisms for managing employment relations across employer boundaries may also aspire to instil employees’ sense of commitment, the multi-enterprise organisation potentially risks the erosion of informality in the regulation of inter-firm relationships.  As Sennett (1998) points out, rather than implying a straightforward rise in centralisation we find increasing complexity in the formality and rigidity of the regulation of employment relations across (and within) diverse subcontractors.  
Discussion and Conclusion
The ability to sell good products and to link the efficiency of the company’s economic performance to individual rewards represents a crucial innovation now embedded in the new manufacturing pattern of production in multi-enterprise organisations in the international motor manufacturing sector. Despite differences in the complexity in the management of inter-firm relations, together with the nature of trade union involvement in managing the social effects of organisational change, the provision of incentives in pursuit of performance standards generates behavioural rules that can reinforce bureaucratic control at work.  These contract rules tend to undermine the systems of collective representation as a key factor in the regulation of employment relationships in our context.  Thus, intriguingly, the use of bureaucratic control emerges as the main element of labour control in this type of workplace in so far as it is filtered through a complex web of inter-firm relationships driven by market rationale.  The logic of the market has the effect of appearing to naturalise competition. The latter is then seen as regulator of economic and social relationships within (and among) firms.
Performance evaluation and reward and discipline at Fiat, VW and Renault were associated with bureaucratic control in Edwards’ sense (1979).  This is important since it highlights the extent to which the conception of bureaucracy, beyond the internal structures of a corporation, now includes activities dispersed to those firms employed to provide services and production to another firm.  This account stands in contrast to arguments that see the emergence through networks of a new anti-bureaucratic production system that empowers workers.  The experience of workers in the four factories is quite different from this.  Here it seems that a modular production system based on a network of diverse subcontractors accelerated rather than reduced the tendency towards centralisation and rigid formal rules.
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^1	 1The research was conducted prior to the recent decision by Fiat in 2002 to transfer production from Rivalta to Mirafiori.  Fiat’s closure of Rivalta followed the short-term alliance with GM, now ended.   
^2	 2Each UTE is responsible for quality control, variance absorption, self-control and continuous improvement of a single segment of the production process. 
^3	 3 Interview TNT employee – June, 2000
^4	 4 ‘Industrial Hotel’ is the expression used at Renault in order to indicate the cluster of firms (vehicle manufacturer and suppliers) operating on the same shop-floor. 
^5	 5 Interview with a VW Production Manager – August, 2000
